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Introduction 
 
Newton set the stage for our view of how science should be done. We remain in 
what I will call the “Newtonian Paradigm in all of physics, including Newton, 
Einstein, and Schrodinger. As I will show shortly, Newton invented and 
bequeathed to us “efficient cause entailing laws” for the entire becoming of the 
universe. With Laplace this became the foundation of contemporary reductionism 
in which all that can happen in the world is due to efficient cause entailing laws. 
More this framework stands as our dominant way to do science. The Newtonian 
Paradigm has done enormous work in science, and helped lead to the Industrial 
Revolution, and even our entry into Modernity. 
 
In this paper I propose to challenge the adequacy of the Newtonian Paradigm on 
two ground: 1) For the evolution of the biosphere beyond the watershed of life, 
we can formulate no efficient cause entailing laws that allow us to deduce the 
evolution of the biosphere. A fortiori, the same holds for the evolution of the 
economy, legal systems, social systems, and culture. Because I have discussed 
this before with my colleagues Longo and Montevil (1,2) and elsewhere, (3,4), my 
discussion of this first point will be rather brief. 2) What I shall choose to call, 
after Aristotleʼs four causes, noted below, Formal Cause Laws derived from 
specific “ensemble theories” tell us about the world. But Formal Cause Laws are 
not reducible to efficient cause entailing laws of the Newtonian Paradigm and, 
critically, have already, unnoticed, crept into biology concerning the origin of life, 
and economics concerning economic growth. Formal cause laws appear to be a 
new way to do science, independent of efficient cause entailing laws. Thus 
Formal Cause laws can be independent of any specific material substrate. This 
may bear on the sufficiency of Materialism in our account of the world. 
 
The intent of this article is to expand how we know our living world and what we 
cannot know but must live in it not knowing, and explore new ways to do science. 
 
This article is organized as follows: In section 1 I briefly discuss Aristotleʼs four 
causes. In PART I, starting in section 2, I discuss Newtonʼs triumph formulating 
the foundations of classical physics and how it led to Aristotelian efficient cause 
entailing laws that became reductionism and remains true even for deterministic 
chaos and quantum mechanics. In section 3 I briefly summarize why we can 
achieve no efficient cause entailing laws for the evolution of the biosphere. If true, 
this spells the end of the reductionist belief of a “Theory of Everything” in which 
all that arises in the universe is entailed by some fundamental theory. This is, in 
itself, if true, a deeply important negative result. It changes our view of the 
becoming of reality. In section 4 I show that no laws of motion entail the evolution 
of the economy. PART II, concerning Formal Cause Laws, starts in section 5 
where I discuss my initial 1971 theory of the spontaneous emergence of 
collectively autocatalytic sets, CAS, (5 - 8), see also Dyson, (9), and major 
improvements by M. Steel and W. Hordijk, themselves and then with me, recently 
(10,11,12). I discuss why the theory of the spontaneous emergence of 
collectively autocatalytic sets is not reducible to efficient cause entailing laws of 
the Newtonian Paradigm. I then characterize this theory as a Formal Cause Law 
that gives us a new way beyond the Newtonian Paradigm to understand the 
world, here the expected origin of molecular reproduction, open to experimental 
testing. In section 6 I discuss two new Formal Law theories in economics that 
again are not reducible to efficient cause entailing laws but give us new insight 
into aspects of economic growth, (11 - 15). Both are testable and may expand 
current economic growth theory with potential practical implications. In the 
Concluding section I hope to evaluate the import of what I have written and place 
science in a broader framework than the Newtonian Paradigm and Reductionism. 
 
PART I. ENTAILING EFFICIENT CAUSE LAWS AND THEIR FAILURE FOR 
THE EVOLVING BIOSPHERE. 
 
Section 1. Aristotleʼs Four Causes 
 
Aristotle famously considered the world as describable by four distinct causes, 
Material, Formal, Final and Efficient. I am not an expert with respect to Aristotle 
and hope that I capture at least approximately what Aristotle meant by these four 
cause. Consider a brick house and a statue. The Material causes of the house 
are the bricks and mortar. The material cause of the statue is the marble from 
which it is carved. The Formal cause of the house or statue is, roughly, what it IS 
for a house to be a house or a statue to BE a statue. The Final cause of the 
house is the blueprint or design of the house and the intent of the builder/owner 
to build the house. The Final Cause of the statue is the artistic inventions of the 
sculptor designing or creating in the process of carving, the statue within the 
marble. Final cause is Aristotleʼs famous “telos”, which became teleology. The 
Efficient Cause of the house or statue are the acts of actually building the house 
by workpeople and tools, or for the statue, the actual work by the sculptor using 
his or her chisel and hammer. 
 
Section 2. Newton and the Newtonian Paradigm: The Invention of Classical 
Physics And Entailing Efficient Cause Laws, Thence, Via Laplace, The Birth of 
Modern Reductionism. 
 
No single mind (other than perhaps Darwin) so changed Western thought than 
did Newton with his invention of the mathematical framework of the differential 
and integral calculus and formulation of his three laws of motion and law of 
universal gravitation that founded Classical physics. 
 
Consider as a simple example seven billiard balls rolling on a billiard table of 
fixed size and shape. Newton tells us to: i. Write down the current positions and 
momenta of all the balls, the initial conditions. Then we are to write down the 
boundary conditions given by the inner edges of the table off of which the balls 
bounce. Then we are to write down Newtonʼs three laws of motion in differential 
equation form giving the “FORCES” between the balls and the boundaries of the 
table. Then we are to integrate these differential equations to obtain the future 
(and past) trajectories of the balls as the “solutions” of the differential equation 
forms of the laws of motion given the initial and boundary conditions. This ignores 
friction that can be handled later. But note crucially that “integration” is the 
deduction of the trajectories from the differential equations giving the forces 
between the balls. And again, critically, deduction is “entailment”. This is the 
same as the Greek syllogism: All men are mortal, Socrates in a man, therefore 
Socrates is a mortal. The two premises of the syllogism logically “forces” the 
conclusion that Socrates is mortal. Thus the conclusion is “entailed” by the two 
premises. Similarly, the initial and boundary conditions, plus the laws of motion in 
differential equation form taken as premises, logically “force” the conclusion given 
by the deduced integrated solutions of the differential equations, so Newton gives 
us a physical world in which all that happens is both deterministic and entirely 
entailed. Nothing novel, in the sense of not being entailed, can arise. 
 
Now what else had Newton done? He had formalized and matemathized 
Aristotleʼs “efficient cause” in his law of motion in differential equation form. Thus 
we can rightly say that Newton, and now the Newtonian Paradigm, gives us 
“efficient cause entailing laws” for the becoming of at least the physical world. 
 
Less noticed is a third thing Newton had done: The boundary conditions of the 
billiard table, plus the positions and momenta of the balls, simultaneously “create” 
or “define” the very phase space of the billiard ball system, that is the boundary 
conditions “define” all “possible” positions and momenta of the billiard balls. 
Because of Newtonʼs third law, the boundaries also play a causal role in the 
dynamics of the system as balls bounce off the walls. 
 
Simon Pierre Laplace a bit more than a century later, generalized Newton to a 
view of an entailed becoming of the entire universe, the birth of modern 
Reductionism. Laplace proposed a giant computing system, the Laplacian 
“demon” in the sky. Were the demon to know at this instant all the positions and 
momenta of all the particles in the universe, then using Newtonʼs laws, the 
demon could integrate Newtonʼs laws of motion in differential equation form to 
achieve the deduced hence entailed becoming of the entire future and past (due 
to time reversibility of Newtonʼs law) of the universe. 
 
There are two features of this worth note. First, this is, of course, the birth of 
modern Reductionism, still seen in S. Weinbergʼs recent “Dreams of a Final 
Theory” (16), a hopefully simple equation that entails all that happens in the 
universe, and, of course, in the 10 to the 500th versions of todayʼs string theory, 
(17). 
 
Second, Laplace believed that the deterministic character of Newtonʼs equations 
and thus entailed trajectories of all the particles meant that the entire future and 
past of the universe was “predictable”. Here he was wrong as Poincareʼ showed. 
 
In the 1890ʼs the great French mathematician, Poincareʼ, tried to solve the 
problem of three mutually gravitating objects under Newtonʼs law of gravitation, 
for example the sun, earth and Venus. Newton, of course, solved the problem for 
two bodies, the sun and earth and achieved his triumph of predicted elliptical 
orbits, thus entailing Keplerʼs laws, that did so much to establish the profound 
creditability of Newtonʼs classical physics. But Newton suspected there would be 
problems for three mutually gravitating objects. 
 
Newton was right. Poincareʼ was the first to discover what we now know as 
“deterministic chaos”. Here infinitesimal changes in initial conditions can lead to 
exponentially diverging trajectories. Since we cannot measure initial conditions to 
infinite accuracy, then even though the system is entirely deterministic, we face 
epistemological randomness. Nevertheless, the entire dynamics remains both 
deterministic and entirely entailed,(18,19). 
 
General Relativity. The equations of General Relativity are entirely deterministic, 
so the efficient causal structure of spacetime is entirely entailed. One obtains in 
General Relativity, not an evolution “in time”, for time has become another 
dimension of spacetime, but instead the entailed efficient causal structure of the 
universe. 
 
Finally we come to the vast transformation of classical physics by quantum 
mechanics and the famous Schrodinger linear wave equation where the left hand 
side of the equation yields the propagating “waves” whose ontological status 
remains uncertain, set equal to a right hand side which is a classical potential, V. 
V constitutes the boundary conditions on the behavior of the propagating 
Schrodinger wave equation. 
 
I make four points. 1). The Born Rule states that the probability that any one of 
the propagating Schrodinger equationʼs waves will be the one “measured” by a 
single quantum measurement is the square of the amplitude, or better, modulus, 
of that wave. I note that in all major versions of quantum mechanics, the specific 
outcome of a single quantum measurement is indeterminate. (In Bohmʼs version 
it is determinate, but the theory is completely non-local (20). 2) Given the Born 
Rule, the entire set of propagating amplitudes have probabilities that add up to 
1.0, so the wave propagates, “unitarily” and, critically, this propagation of ALL the 
probabilities is entirely deterministic, hence the Schodinger equation entirely 
entails the evolution, not of a trajectory, but of a probability distribution. 3) Thus, 
with the possible exception of the outcomes of single quantum measurements 
which may be ontologically indeterminate, and if so, the outcome of any single 
quantum measurement is NOT entailed, quantum mechanics preserves the 
entailed becoming of the universe. I note that even if the outcome of any single 
quantum measurement is unentailed by quantum mechanics, the set of 
POSSIBLE outcomes is entirely entailed. 4. The classical potential, V, on the 
right hand side of the Schrodinger equation constitutes again the boundary 
conditions of the quantum system and again “creates” or “defines” the phase 
space of all the possible behaviors of the quantum system. However, unlike the 
classical boundary conditions of the billiard table which, with the positions and 
momenta of the balls, also “create” the classical phase space, but in classical 
physics via Newtonʼs third law the billiard wall boundaries also play a causal role, 
in quantum mechanics the classical potential, V, which both constitutes the 
boundary conditions on the quantum system and “creates” the phase space of all 
the possible behaviors of the quantum system, plays no causal role at all. V is 
merely a boundary condition and, because it plays no causal role I want to say 
that V “enables” the behavior of the quantum system via the “enabling 
constraints” afforded by V as boundary conditions. We will find an unexpected 
analogy to this enablement by V in what I shall call an ever changing, and 
typically unprestatable, “Adjacent Possible” “created” by ever new adaptations 
that constitute enabling constraints in the evolution of the biosphere. 
 
Reductionism. It remains the dream of many physicists that the entire becoming 
of the universe is entailed. The concept of “efficient cause”, as noted, is clearly a 
mathematization of Aristotleʼs efficient cause in all of classical physics. This is 
less clear in the unitary propagation of the Schrodinger equation whose evolution 
is entirely determinisitic, but it is not clear what is “waving” in the Schrodinger 
wave equation and thus in what sense this deterministic wave equation remains 
an “efficient cause” entailing law. For the purposes of this discussion, however, I 
do not think this issue need detain us.  
 
Thus the framework of all modern physics, from General Relativity to quantum 
mechanics to string theories as far as I know, remain an entailed becoming of our 
one universe or the multiverse. On the multiple world interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, (21), the universe splits at each quantum measurement. By splitting, 
measurement never happens. What are entirely entailed are each of the Possible 
universes that can split off as the unitary wave equation propagates. 
 
In short in all of standard modern physics, classical and quantum, the Newtonian 
Paradigm of an entailed becoming of the universe remains in place and has 
constituted since Newton are basic framework for science. 
 
Section 3. No Entailing Laws, But Enablement In the Evolution Of The Biosphere. 
The title of this section is also, without capitals, the title of an article by Giuseppe 
Longo, Mael Montevil, two French mathematicians at the Ecole National 
Superieur, Paris, and myself, posted on Physics ArXhiv Jan 11, 2012, (1), and 
subsequently published, (2). In addition, I have myself expanded upon it in other 
publications, some now published, (3,4). I urge the reader to consult the Physics 
ArXhiv posted paper or the published version under the title of this section for the 
most detailed discussion of these topics relating the evolution of the biosphere to 
physics. 
 
Here are the central claims: 
 
1) In physics we can always prestate the phase space, say the seven billiard 
balls on a billiard table. By this prestatement we are enabled to write down, as 
Newton did, laws of motion plus boundary conditions, as in the case of the seven 
billiard balls on the billiard table. Here note, as above, a critical fact: the boundary 
condition of the edges of the table, plus the positions and momenta the seven 
balls, define or “create” the phase space of ALL the possible positions and 
momenta of the billiard balls. Further, without knowing ahead of time the 
boundary conditions of the billiard tableʼs edges, we could not integrate Newtonʼs 
laws of motion in differential equation form, even had we the initial conditions. 
Without the boundary conditions, we would have no mathematical model of the 
system. 
 
2) In the evolution of the biosphere, the very phase space of what is possible for 
the behavior of the evolving system persistently changes, but does so in 
unprestatable ways, a claim defended just below. Thus we can write no 
equations of motion for the evolving biosphere. Further we cannot non- circularly 
define the “niche boundary” condtions on evolution, so could not integrate the 
equations of motion, even were we to have them, which we do not. Thus, we 
claim, the evolution of the biosphere is entailed by no efficient cause laws. 
 
3) Without selection acting to achieve it, the evolving biosphere creates its ever 
new “Adjacent Possible set of opportunities that enable but do not cause ever 
new and typically unprestatable adjacent possible evolutionary pathways. 
Evolution, beyond selectionʼs achievement, persistently creates its own future 
possibilities of becoming. This claim says that the becoming of the biosphere is 
not merely a web of cause and effect” but also of enabled adjacent possible 
“opportunities”, “seized” by unentailed and typically unprestatable evolutionary 
innovations which constitute the “arrival of the fitter”, an issue never solved by 
Darwin. 
 
4) In a new analogy to the boundary conditions of classical and quantum 
mechanics, the ever changing actual “context” of the biosphere constitutes 
“enabling constraints” that as enabling constraints “create” the Adjacent space of 
possibilities into which evolution can become. Then that becoming creates a new 
specific evolutionary situation or context of actual adaptations that again act as 
enabling constraints creating ever new, typically unprestatable Adjacent Possible 
directions for evolution. This, if true, is striking. In classical and quantum physics 
there is a sharp distinction between prestated boundary conditions which “create” 
the phase space of the physical system, and the dynamical laws of the system, 
where the laws, the boundary conditions and the initial conditions are required to 
deduce the entailed behavior of the physical system. The evolution of the 
biosphere is unentailed and often unprestatable, and also the boundary 
conditions “co-mingle” as enabling constraints yielding the ever new Adjacent 
possibilities, or “opportunities” they “enable”, that then gives rise to further 
evolutionary innovations, the typically unprestatable “arrival of the fitter”, that then 
constitutes the next changed context of the becoming biosphere, which, in turn 
creates a new Adjacent Possible. 
 
Here briefly are the central arguments: 
 
i. Can you name all the uses of a screwdriver? Well, screw in a screw, open a 
can of paint, stab an assailant, wedge open a door, tie to a stick to spear a fish, 
rent spear to locals for 5% of the catch....Two features here are critical. The 
number of uses of a screwdriver is INDEFINITE. Further, while the integers are 
naturally orderable, there is no natural ordering of the uses, as above, of a 
screwdriver alone or with other objects or processes. But these two premises 
imply that there is no effective procedure or algorithm to list “all” the uses of a 
screwdriver, or, in general, no effective procedure to search for a new use of a 
screwdriver. We believe this conclusion is correct. This is the famous Frame 
Problem of Computer Science, (22), never solved since Turing invented his 
machine. We believe our brief argument above shows that there is no algorithmic 
solution to the frame problem. 
 
ii. The above depends upon “use” as a primitive concept. “Use” is not a term in 
physics. Is it justifiable, or equally so, is the term “function” in the biological sense 
in which the function of the heart is to pump blood not make heart sounds, 
justified. In (3,4) I argue that “use” and “function” are fully justified for two reasons 
we need. a. Above the level of atoms, say for proteins length 200 amino acids, 
the universe would require 10 to the 39th power its lifetime to make all these 
proteins just once, even were all 10 to the 80th particles making such proteins on 
the Planck time scale. So the universe is vastly non- repeating, or “non-ergodic”, 
above the level of atoms. Above the level of atoms, the universe is on a unique 
trajectory. Most complex things will never exist. b. Cells and organisms are 
Kantian Wholes, (3,4), in which the parts exist for and by means of the whole and 
the whole exists for and by means of the parts. Kantian wholes "get to exist" via 
reproduction in the non-ergodic universe above the complexity of atoms. Then 
we can define the “function” or “use” of a part, say the heart, as that causal 
consequence which helps maintain the Kantian whole in exitence, thus the 
function of the heart is pumping blood, not jiggling water in the pericardial sac. 
“Functions” and “uses” are real in the universe for Kantian wholes. 
 
iii.Now consider an evolving and reproducing lineage of bacteria in, say some 
new environment. Calling a “USE ACHIEVED” or “FUNCTION ACHIEVED” a 
“TASK ACHIEVED”, the first thing to notice is that the dividing bacterium in its 
environment achieves a vast “Task Closure” in which all the tasks, say making 
membranes, building proteins, replicating DNA, making chemosmotic pumps, 
achieving cell division and partition of daughter DNA molecues, sensing and 
responding to its world, all occur. The critical issue is this: All that has to happen 
in evolution is that some molecular screwdriver in one of these evolving cells 
“finds a use” that enhances the fitness of that bacterium in its environment, there 
must be heritable variation for that “use”, and Natural Selection acting, not at the 
level of the molecular screwdriver, but at the level of the whole cell in its world, 
will probably pull out the new variant with the new use of that molecular 
screwdriver. But this new use is typically not prestatable and also changes the 
very phase space of evolution where Task Closures of functionalities and, thus 
the phenotypes of Kantian Wholes are critical parts of the relevant variables in 
that phase space. That is, the phase space of functional closures Kantian 
Wholes in the evolving biosphere, which functions constitute the relevant features 
in evolution, hence its phase space, changes persistently in unprestatable ways. 
Thus, in general, we can write no laws of motion for the evolution of the 
biosphere. 
 
iv. Further, the abiotic and biotic actual niche of the evolving bacterium cannot be 
stated non-circularly. The bacterium achieves task closure by causal pathways or 
quantum processes that pass via the environment. But we cannot prestate non-
circularly that task closure for either the organism alone or its relevant Actual 
Niche alone. The total task closure involves both the organism and the “actual 
niche”, but that task closure is only revealed after selection acts at the 
level of the Kantian Whole in its world to pick the winners. Thus, we cannot 
prestate the niche boundary conditions on evolution. 
 
v. Lacking foreknowledge of the changing phase space and the boundary 
conditions, we can write no laws of motion nor could we integrate them even if 
we had them. Evolution is therefore entailed by no laws at all. If true, the 
Newtonian Paradigm and Reductionism is broken at the watershed of evolving 
life. Negative results can be important, from the failure to find a contradiction in 
assuming that the parallel postulate of Euclid was false, to Poincare’s negative 
result, to Godel’s negative result. This negative result, if true, says we cannot 
even mathematize the evolution of Kantian Wholes in their worlds.  
 
vi. The niche does not cause, but enables evolution. Heritable variation is 
typically due to quantum random mutations that are quantum measurement 
events, so acausal. The niche enables the evolution of organisms selected for 
fitter variants within it, but does not cause that evolution.  
 
Section 4. No Entailing Laws of Motion for the Evolution of the Economy Can Be 
Written or Integrated 
 
I next show that, like the evolving biosphere, no laws entail the evolution of the 
economy. Our discussion of the evolving biosphere showed that new uses of 
molecular screwdrivers, once selected, become actual features of the biosphere 
that act as enabling constraints to create ever new, partially unprestatable, 
Adjacent Possible opportunities that are then “seized” in evolution by the arrival 
of still new fitter organisms with new molecular screwdrivers or other features that 
find again new uses that enhance the fitness of these next organisms. In turn 
these new organisms are enabling constraints that create new, often 
unprestatable “empty adjacent possible niches”, or opportunities that in turn 
enable, but do not cause, the next innovative step in evolution. Evolution, as 
noted above, is thus not only a web of efficient cause and effect, but of enabling 
constraints that create adjacent possible opportunities for further evolution that in 
turn creates new actualities that are again new enabling constraints creating yet 
again new adjacent possibilities for further evolution to “seize”. 
 
Just the same process occurs in the evolution of the economic web. I give two 
cases. The first may be only a story, the second true. In the first, engineers are 
trying to invent the tractor. They know they will need a huge engine block, find 
one, and mount it on a chassis, which promptly breaks. They mount the engine 
block on a succession of ever larger chassis all of which break. Then one 
engineer says, “You know, the engine block is so big and rigid, we can use the 
engine block itself as the chassis and hang everything off the engine block!” And 
that is indeed how tractors and in past times, formula racing cars, are and were 
made. 
 
What had the engineer done? He had found a new, typically unprestatable USE 
of the engine block: Its rigidity could be used for the engine block to serve as a 
chassis. He had solved the Frame Problem in a new way that is not 
algorithmically prestatable. Again, the number of uses of a screwdriver is 
indefinite and unorderable, so no effective procedure or algorithm can find all the 
uses of a screwdriver, or, in general, find a new use of a screwdriver. The new 
uses of screwdrivers and engine blocks are typically unprestatable. 
But with the invention of the engine block AS the chassis, the very phase space 
of economic evolution changed in an unprestatable way, hence we can write no 
laws of motion for the evolving economy. Nor can we non-circularly prestate the 
niche uses, that is, the actual market for, the tractor which are the boundary 
conditions that enable that use but do not cause it. We typically cannot non- 
circularly prestate the market for a tractor independently of the tractor, until we 
have tried and succeeded, if we do, in finding uses for the tractor that some un- 
predefined market supports. Thus we neither have laws of motion nor do we 
know the boundary conditions, so cannot integrate the laws we do not have. 
Thus, no laws entail the evolution of the economy. 
 
A second example makes the same point, as reported in the New York Times in 
2011. A Japanese man in Tokyo lived in a very tiny apartment with 2000 books 
and a new baby. Desperate for space, he scanned his books into his iPad and 
sold the books, so had more space. Then he realized his new business 
opportunity: Many in crowded Tokyo lived in tiny apartments, and were similarly 
crowded by their own books. His new business consisted in scanning the books 
of these people into their own iPads, selling the books and taking a percentage of 
the sales price received as his income. Now, what were the enabling constraint 
complements of his new business that created this new, unprestatable, Adjacent 
Possible empty economic niche, or opportunity which opportunity enabled, but 
did not cause, his new business? Well, Tokyo is crowded so built many tiny 
apartments. Many living in these apartments owned books. Apple invented the 
iPad that was one way to scan books. What did the Japanese man do? He 
discovered or invented a “new use” for the iPad in the context of the above 
conditions, namely use the iPad to scan the books of others in tiny apartments, 
sell the books and take a share of the sales receipts as his income. 
 
Note four things: In general, the new use the Japanese man found was 
unprestatable, as is the case for the tractor above. Second, the actual context of 
crowded apartments and the existence of the iPad created an Adjacent Possible 
opportunity, or possibility space, for a new business. Third, the invention of the 
“new use” for the iPad was an innovation that seized the new opportunity. Fourth, 
Apple, in inventing the iPad, surely had no intent to enable this new business in 
Tokyo. Thus, just as in the evolving biosphere new uses of molecular 
screwdrivers, once selected, just as enabling constraints that create new empty 
adjacent possible niches or opportunities without natural selection “struggling” to 
achieve those new empty niches create new evolutionary opportunities, so also, 
the growing economy creates new “actuals” or “contexts” where the new actual 
context is an enabling constraint that enables a new adjacent possible 
opportunity that can then be seized to create a new way to make a living. In turn 
that new way of making a living can become a new context that is an enabling 
constraint for the creation of yet another new adjacent possible opportunity. 
All this is entirely missing in standard single sector models of economic growth. 
All this flourished in Silicon Valley, an innovation hub of the modern economy.  
 
Tying the truths just noted to standard factors of economic growth, such as the 
role of adequate capital to fund new businesses, stable government, money, 
banks, budget constraints, demand, and an adequate theory of price formation 
when we cannot prestate all the future relevant goods and production capacities 
– a statement required by current theories of price formation - requires further 
work. 
 
PART II. FORMAL CAUSE LAWS VIA ENSEMBLE THEORIES 
 
A new form of “law”, which is not efficient cause law, and which I will call “Formal 
Cause Law”, has crept into biology and economics, if not beyond. The rest of this 
article examines four of these cases, two from biology concerning the origin of 
life, and two from economics related in new ways to understanding economic 
growth. We will see that Formal Cause Laws are not reducible to familiar efficient 
cause entailing laws, yet tell us about the real world and can be testable.  
 
Because Formal Cause laws can be independent of any specific efficient causes, 
they seem to allow us to understand the world beyond Materialism, a large claim, 
and a potential new way to do science. 
 
Section 5. A Formal Law Theory of the Origin of Life 
 
In 1971, (6), I was interested in the massive problem of the origin of life, which 
obviously includes the origin of molecular reproduction. Most attention was and 
remains focused on template replication of polynucleotides such as DNA or RNA 
with their famous Watson-Crick nucleotide base pairing. My own intuition was 
and remains that Watson Crick base pairing is far too special chemically to be 
deeply requisite for molecular reproduction. If not such template replication, what 
might be an alternative approach? The clear thought was a single molecule that 
catalyzed its own formation from precursors autocatalytically, or more generally, 
a SET of molecules, each of which catalyzed the formation of one or more 
members of the set from some exogenous ʻfood molecules”, so that the set as a 
“whole” was “collectively autocatalytic”, CAS. So my first idea was CAS. 
 
But how could such collectively autocatalytic sets possibly form spontaneously on 
the early earth if molecular reproduction indeed started on earth. I built from 
knowledge of the famous work of Erdos and Renyi, (23), on random graphs. Here 
one considers a set of N independent nodes and connects random pairs of nodes 
by a line, or “arc”. Erdos and Reyni asked foundational questions and found 
astonishing answers. Define a “component” of such an undirected (because the 
arcs are lines, not arrows), graph as a connected set of nodes. 
 
As more and more arcs are added, connecting random pairs of nodes, at first 
almost all nodes are not connected to other nodes and a few pairs of connected 
nodes appear, then some triplets of connected nodes emerge, then eventually a 
modest number of mid-sized clusters. But then magic occurs, adding a few more 
arcs will randomly connect nodes in different mid-sized clusters and suddenly 
most or all of the mid-sized clusters become interconnected into a “giant 
component” component in the graph. 
 
For convenience, define the “size” of the largest component as the fraction of the 
N total nodes in that component, so this fraction ranges from 1/N to N/N =1. 
More precisely, if one plots the ratio of arcs to nodes on the X axis and the size of 
the largest component, (the one connecting the largest number of nodes), on the 
Y axis, one obtains a curve reflecting the “average or generic properties” of a 
vast ensemble of all random Erdos Renyi graphs. This curve is remarkable as the 
above emergence of the “giant component” hints. At first, as the ratio of arcs to 
nodes increases from 0/N at the origin on the X axis, the size of the largest 
component says near 0/N. Then mid-sized clusters emerge and the curve slopes 
gradually away from the X axis and higher on the Y axis. Then the curve 
steepens sigmoidally at a specific ratio of arcs to nodes that is equal to 0.5. At 
just this point on the X axis, suddenly, averaged over the vast ensemble of 
random graphs, the “giant component” emerges as do cycles of all lengths. As 
the ratio of arcs to nodes increases further more and more single nodes and 
remaining small clusters are added to the giant component. 
 
Two points are now essential. First as the total number of nodes and arcs 
increases towards infinity, the sigmoidal curve steepens to a step function. Thus 
the emergence of the giant component is a first order phase transition, like the 
water to ice phase transition. Equally important the Erdos Renyi results show us 
“why” the emergence of the giant component is “expected”. 
 
The results of Erdos and Renyi suggested how collectively autocatalytic sets 
might emerge spontaneously. Consider a system of chemicals undergoing 
reactions to form chemicals, fed by some outside source of “food molecules”, say 
small organic molecules as part of an organic molecule chemical reaction 
system. But I wanted the molecules in the reaction system to be candidates to 
catalyze the very reactions in that reaction system hoping that a collectively 
autocatalytic set might emerge. The best known class of catalysts associated 
with life than and now are protein enzymes, with evidence that even small 
proteins, called peptides, can catalyze reactions, so I considered a reaction 
system of amino acids and small and large linear polymers of amino acids as 
small and large peptides. I sought conditions for the spontaneous emergence of 
peptide (and later RNA or RNA and/or peptide) collectively autocatalytic sets. 
 
Any theory seeking the spontaneous emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets 
must consider classes of chemical reaction networks, sustained away from 
equilibrium by some source of “food molecules”. In addition it must either know in 
fact, or posit some theory about which molecules in the reaction system catalyze 
which reactions. If these issues are known, one can examine any given food set 
and reaction system with catalysis included, and ask if the system contains a 
collectively autocatalytic set. 
 
A first point: We do not know, in general, say for peptides and any class of 
reaction systems, which peptides catalyze which reactions. This question can be 
tested using libraries of stochastic peptides (or of RNA). 
 
Then the first step is to consider chemical reaction systems. These, unlike Erdos 
Renyi graphs which consist only of nodes, are “bipartite graphs”, with nodes 
representing molecules and small boxes, or squares, representing reactions 
among input and output molecules of each reaction. Chemical reactions can be 
one substrate one product reactions, two substrate one product reactions, one 
substrate two product reactions, two substrate two product reactions and more 
complex reactions. 
 
In my initial model I considered the molecules, as noted, to be peptides and 
considered two reactions: ligation of two smaller peptides into one longer peptide, 
and cleavage of a longer peptide into two smaller peptides. I then made a simple 
representation of peptides of only two types of amino acids, labeled 1 and 0. 
Thus a model peptide is just a binary string (10010101) of some length. Next, I 
set a maximum length for such molecular “binary strings” to be length N “bits”. 
 
Based on this, the molecular reaction system consisted in all “bit strings”, from 
length 1, ie the amino acids 1 and 0, to all 2 to the Nth power bit strings length N. 
The bipartite reaction graph considered for the moment only ligation reactions, 
shown as two bit string substrates represented as nodes, and black arrows 
leading to the “reaction box” where these two are ligated, then a single black 
arrow leading from the reaction box to the ligated product of the two substrate 
strings. The arrows above point only in the ligation direction, but in general, the 
model molecules can also cleave into the two initial substrates. Using only single 
arrows allows easy representation, but most real reactions are reversible and will 
flow thermodynamically in either direction toward chemical equilibrium, here 
ignored. In reality, many reactions occur spontaneously at some rate. I idealized 
these spontaneous reactions as so slow that the rate could be set to 0, denoted 
by the use of black arrows. 
 
With the above, three immediate questions arise: i. As N increases, how many 
molecules are there in the reaction system? ii. As N increases, how many 
reactions, represented by the boxes, are there in the system? iii. What is the ratio 
of reactions to molecules in the system? The latter is the essential question. For 
the case of linear polymers and considering only ligations and cleavage 
reactions, as N, the length of the longest peptide, increases the ratio of reactions 
to polymers increases linearly in N. 
 
Next I needed a model of which molecules catalyzed which reactions. I have 
used two models. The simplest is that each molecule as a fixed probability, P, to 
catalyse each reaction. In the model under consideration, each molecule is 
tested, with probability P, for whether it catalyzes each reaction and if “yes”, a 
blue arrow is drawn from the catalyst to the reaction box representing the 
reaction catalysed. By assumption, catalyzed reactions occur “rapidly”, denoted 
by changing the color of the arrows from black to red. 
 
In any single realization of this model, once all the molecules have been 
assigned according to P which reactions they catalyze, some set of reaction 
arrows have become “red”, and one can ask if the reaction system of catalyzed 
reactions contains a collectively autocatalytic set. 
 
The “magic” occurs, in parallel to the emergence of the Erdos Renyi “Giant 
Component”, as the size of the longest polymer, N, increases, for any fixed P, or 
P increases for fixed N. At some value of these parameters, because the ratio of 
reactions to molecules increases linearly with N, so many reactions are catalyzed 
that the “red arrow” catalyzed reaction subgraph forms a giant component of 
connected catalyzed reactions. At that point, with probability approaching 1.0, the 
reaction boxes connecting the molecules in this giant component all receive blue 
arrows from the very molecules in the giant component. 
 
At just this point, a collectively autocatalytic set has emerged, (7-12). In short the 
emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets is an expected “phase transition”, 
analogous to the emergence of the giant component in Erdos Renyi random 
graphs. 
 
Two issues are of importance: The emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets is 
a phase transition in “typical” members of the ensemble of reaction systems.  
 
Second, the theory tells us “why” the emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets 
are “expected”. This last point will be important below. 
 
These results are shown in a 1986 article, (7), and my first book, (9). 
 
A second model of which molecules catalyze which reactions requires the 
catalyst molecule “match” the two substrates at a few of their terminal model 
amino acids where the two model peptides are to be ligated. Mismatches can be 
tunably allowed. Given a requisite match, then the candidate catalyst has again a 
fixed probability of catalyzing that reaction. Again, as the length of longest 
polymer, N, catalytic match site parameters, and probability of catalysis, P, given 
a match, are tuned, the same phase transition occurs and a phase transition to a 
collectively autocatalytic set occurs, (9). 
 
Very recently, Michael Steel, a mathematician, and Wim Hordijk, a computer 
scientist, have extended this model, by relaxing my strict and unrealistic 
assumption that without a catalyst, no reaction occurs, ie occurs at 0 rate. Steel 
and Hordijk call their collectively autocatalytic systems RAFs (10,11). There are 
important improvements in these latter models. In my initial model the number of 
reactions any polymer catalyses increases exponentially in N, which is not 
chemically known to be plausible. In Steel and Hordijksʼ results, the number of 
reactions any polymer catalyses when a self reproducing RAF arises is only 
between 1 and 2, surely chemically plausible. I describe below other features 
Steel, Hordijk and I with them have found (12). 
 
Before I discuss the status as Formal Cause Laws of the above theories about 
model ensembles of chemical reaction systems that become collectively 
autocatalytic spontaneously as an expected phase transition, I briefly discuss 
experimental work bearing on this model. These experiments demonstrate that 
Formal Cause Laws can be testable, although, as we will see, they are not 
reducible to efficient cause entailing laws. 
 
In 1987, the first collectively autocatalytic set was created, consisting of two DNA 
hexamers, A and B, where A ligated two trimer nucleotide sequences to form 
hexamer B, and B ligated two timers to form A, (24). Between 1995 and 2000, a 
single autocatalytic peptide was created, (25), and at present a nine peptide 
collectively autocatalytic peptide set has been created (26). This result is 
fundamental, for it shows that molecular reproduction definitely does not require 
nucleotide by nucleotide template replication by Watson - Crick base pairing of 
DNA, RNA or similar molecules. In short, the cornerstone of the RNA World, that 
life must be based on RNA template replication, is demonstrably not necessary. 
Collectively autocatalysis, as I hoped in 1971, is far broader than the DNA or 
RNA double helix and its template replication. More recently, RNA collectively 
autocatalytic sets have been made, (27). 
 
But the above CAS required the wisdom of a chemist to construct. Could such 
sets emerge spontaneously? Very recently it has been shown that a library of 
ribozyme molecules, each cut in half, can be put into a solution rich in 
magnesium ions. The half ribozymes can self assemble into hybrid ribozymes 
and then spontaneously form single autocatalytic molecules and 3,5,and 7 
membered collectively autocatalytic sets. Importantly the longer collectively 
autocatalytic sets kinetically outcompete the single autocatalyst, (28) so 
collectively autocatalytic sets “win” this simple Darwinian race. This experiment, 
for the first time, shows the spontaneous formation of CAS. However, the 
molecules in the system are fragments of evolved RNA sequences, ribozymes. 
We are not far, I hope, from showing that libraries of stochastic peptides, or 
stochastic RNA sequences, or both, can spontaneously form self reproducing 
collectively autocatalytic sets, as proposed in a broad early published patent of 
M. Ballivet and myself, meant also to discover the probability that stochastic 
peptides catalyze specific reactions and find drugs, (29-31). 
 
If such collectively autocatalytic sets from libraries of stochastic peptides or RNA 
or both can form and be placed in budding lipid vesicles called liposomes (32), 
one can hope that we are not far from protocells. Many issues then arise, from 
inhibition of catalysis leading to complex dynamics, linking of exergonic and 
endergonic reactions as in real cells, enabling the capturing of energy and 
formation of chemical work cycles, and thus a minimal model of “agency”, (33), 
and recent theory suggesting that CAS in budding liposomes, (34), will 
synchronize the reproduction of both the CAS and liposome forming, indeed, 
protocells. Other recent theoretical work shows that such systems can undergo at 
least limited open ended evolution, (35), and that cells doing work cycles may 
maximize a power efficiency at a specific displacement from chemical 
equilibrium, (36). 
 
I now turn to the critical question of the status of the theory of the spontaneous 
emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets. Is this theory anything like the 
Newtonian Paradigm? The answer is NO. There are no laws of dynamical motion 
of chemical changing concentrations as a function of free energy, ie efficient 
causes, no initial or boundary conditions, hence no integration of the absent laws 
of motion to yield entailed trajectories in a chemical concentration space that 
exhibits molecular reproduction. No Newtonian Paradigm at all is here. 
Instead, what we have considered is a vast ensemble of chemical reaction 
networks and possible assignments of which molecules catalyze which reaction 
and demonstrated by theorems (7,9) and improved theorems (10-12), that at 
some point in the parameter spaces considered, collectively autocatalytic sets 
emerge as an expected phase transition. But this theory ignores efficient causes, 
or better perhaps, the theory assumes that such efficient causes exist for the 
processes involved but is not based on those specific efficient causes at all other 
than that they exist. The theory is about the emergent organization of 
reproducing systems, whatever the efficient causes driving those processes may 
be. Indeed, below I will show below that the real economy is also a collectively 
autocatalytic set. The binary strings in the model, (1001010), can represent 
molecules or goods. The “boxes” can represent chemical reactions or economic 
production functions. So the CAS theory does not care about any specific 
efficient causes, it cares only about the emergent organization of self reproducing 
systems of objects and process transforming the objects and aiding those 
transformations, whatever the objects, transformations among them and aiding 
those transformations may be, thus however those processes may be efficiently 
caused. 
 
In short, the theory of the spontaneous emergence of self reproducing 
organizations of objects and processes is NOT an efficient cause entailing law. 
Yet the theory seems to be telling us about the real world, for example, how the 
origin of molecular reproduction may be “expected” to have occurred as a phase 
transition. More the theory is testable, for example using libraries of stochastic 
peptides, RNA sequences or both. If this theory can be called a “law”, which I 
think it can, it is not an efficient cause law. I propose that such laws are, 
borrowing Aristotleʼs “formal cause”, Formal Cause Laws. 
 
An essential point follows: The Formal Cause Law about the “expected” 
emergence of self reproducing systems of objects and processes is not reducible 
to any specific physical - or economic - realization. Consider a specific real 
chemical reaction system. Using free energies, chemical potential barriers to 
reactions, the lowering of such barriers by catalysis, can we use the Newtonian 
Paradigm of differential equations then integration to ask if such a system is a 
CAS? Of course we can. But NO SET of such real chemical efficient cause 
entailed dynamical systems constitutes the CAS theory I have discussed. This is 
true at least because the Formal Law CAS theory is independent of any specific 
efficient causes and defined for an entire ensemble of “random” chemical 
reaction networks let alone economies. Second, merely demonstrating that any 
set of real chemical reaction systems contains a collectively autocatalytic set 
does not yet tell us why such sets are EXPECTED. To account for the “expected” 
emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets we would have to invent the CAS 
theory itself, which is independent of any specific efficient causes in any specific 
chemical reaction network. 
 
This raises another important issue: If CAS theory is right and is “Formal Cause 
Law”, then it constitutes the “fundamental” account of the origin of molecular 
reproduction and thus in part the fundamental account of this aspect of the origin 
of life. Of course, CAS theory is not alone sufficient: It entirely leaves out the 
efficient cause aspects of the thermodynamics of open non-equilibrium systems, 
which is a necessary part of any such account, any specific knowledge about 
chemistry, supramolecular chemistry, dynamic kinetic stability, (37), and other 
topics. But if CAS theory “is” the fundamental account of why molecular 
reproduction can be expected to emerge, Formal Cause Laws are not reducible 
to Efficient cause entailing laws. They seem to be a newly seen, different kind of 
law. If so, then it is interesting that Schrodinger and Bohr are said, (37), to have 
worried that the then known laws of physics were insufficient to account for life. 
They hoped for new physical laws. But if the CAS Formal Law theory is right, eg 
as testable using libraries of stochastic peptides, then Schrodinger and Bohr 
were both right and wrong: They were right in that the efficient cause entailing 
laws of physics were insufficient explanations of why molecular reproduction 
would be expected to arise, but seem to be wrong in seeking the sufficient 
answer in yet further efficient cause entailing physical laws. 
Thus, Formal Cause Laws tell us about the real world, but are not reducible to 
efficient cause laws. Therefore, we escape the belief from Laplace to Weinberg 
that the becoming of the universe is entirely explained by efficient cause entailing 
laws. 
 
We have now found two ways beyond standard Reductionism, in Part 1 where no 
efficient cause laws entail the evolution of the biosphere and now in our first 
example in Part 2 of the Formal Cause Laws that explain the expected 
emergence of self reproducing molecular systems. 
 
In the next section on economic models we will find that Formal Cause Laws give 
insight into the real world when, as in Part 1, that worldʼs becoming is not 
reducible to efficient cause entailing laws. 
 
Section 6 Two Formal Cause Laws of Economic Growth 
 
I here discuss two aspects of economic growth. Both are missing from standard 
economic theories of economic growth which typically treat the economy as a 
single sector and then ask how capital, labor, human knowledge, growth in 
human knowledge, savings, investment and macroeconomic monetary policy 
bear on economic growth as shown typically in differential equation models. 
 
But the economy is obviously not a single sector. It is a vast web of interlocked 
goods and production capacities, where goods can be complements or 
substitutes. It becomes an obvious question whether the very diversity of this 
economic web plays a role in the growth of new goods, production capacities, 
and economic sectors. The history of Silicon Valley, where new technologies 
created opportunities to form new companies that innovated with yet more new 
technologies is a case in point. 
 
Subcritical and Supracritical Economies. 
 
In the past 50,000 years, the diversity of goods and production capacities of the 
global economy has exploded from perhaps 10,000 to perhaps 10,000,000,000. 
This explosion of new goods and production capacities exemplifies supracritical 
economic growth of new ways to make a living. The current global, U.S, and First 
World economies are, taken together, supracritical, persistently creating new 
goods and production capacities. 
 
By contrast, some economies are subcritical, they do not generate an increasing 
diversity of new goods and production capacities. Alberta Canada is an example. 
Alberta produces timber, oil, wheat, and beef, all predominately for export, with a 
small IT industry hanging off oil. It is not producing an increasing diversity of 
goods and production capacities, so is subcritical.  
The distinction between supracritical and subcritical seems to be missing in 
economic growth theory. 
 
Further, Alberta has a stable government, stable money, stable banks, an 
educated population, fine infrastructure and is the wealthiest Province in Canada. 
All these are taken by the famous Washington consensus to be, with other 
economic factors, essential conditions for economic growth. And Alberta is 
successful as an export economy, but is tethered to the world market. But 
obviously the conditions of the Washington consensus are not sufficient to lead to 
supracritical economic growth, nor therefore to an economy which creates, sells 
and buys its products largely internally, rather than depending heavily upon 
export markets. 
 
These facts suggest we need new thinking. Indeed, these facts suggest that the 
diversity and complexity of an economy is related to its growth for which there is 
early empirical data, (38). 
 
I now describe a Formal Cause Law theory of subcritical and supracritical 
economic growth and a critical phase transition between them. Plot on the X axis 
the diversity of renewable resources in some economy, say Alberta or the U.S. 
On the Y axis plot the diversity of production capacities. Now make the incredibly 
over-simple assumption that any production capacity has some probability, P, of 
“acting on” any renewable resource to generate a new good. Thus assign at 
random, hence from an ensemble, which production capacities act on renewable 
resources to create a first generation of new goods, denominated merely as 
numbers. Then iterate this process so the same production capacities can act on 
the first generation of new goods to produce a second generation, and so on. 
Note that this model is entirely innocent of any specification of the efficient 
causes by which an abstract production function “acts on” a given abstract input 
good to produce a new abstract output good. In short, the theory is not 
dependent upon the specific efficient cause mechanisms. 
 
This model, of which an earlier version is based on a “grammar model” specifying 
which goods are production capacities acting to transform input to output goods 
rather than random assignment of goods and production capacities, (13), has 
been solved analytically and numerically, (14). It exhibits a subcritical region in 
the X Y phase space near the origin and extending near the axis up and out the 
Y and X axis. A roughly hyperbolic curve demarks the boundary of the subcritical 
region, and beyond this “critical” phase transition boundary, the economy is 
supracritical, generating an explosion of new goods. 
 
Missing from this model are budget constraints, a consumer with preferences and 
other aspects of a more realistic economy, discussed briefly in my first two 
books, (9,13). 
 
The main point to make is this: Even this simple model demonstrates a first 
insight into the phase transition between subcritical and supracrtical economic 
growth in the diversity of goods, as the generic behavior of an ensemble of model 
economies. While not yet examined, more realistic models with a diversity of non- 
random assignments of which production capacities act on which goods, budget 
constraints, one or more consumers having utility functions, perhaps markets or 
social planners, will probably all exhibit the same phase transition between 
subcritical and supracritical economic growth. But this model is not an efficient 
cause model in the Newtonian Paradigm at all. It is, I propose, a Formal Cause 
Law. 
 
I next describe a further published feature of this simple model, (15). If the 
economy is held to the critical hyperbolic line separating sub and supracritical 
behavior, new goods arise and old goods go extinct in small and large 
avalanches. Just such avalanches were noted years ago by Joseph Schumpeter, 
and are called Schumpeterian “Gales of Creative Destruction” in which old 
sectors die and new ones emerge. In our model, when the economy is held 
critical, these Schumpeterian gales or avalanches show a characteristic 
distribution of many small and few large avalanches. Plotting the log of avalanche 
size on the X axis and the log of the number of avalanches of a given (binned) 
size on the Y axis, one obtains a straight line sloping down to the right at a slope 
of -1.5. A straight line in a log log plot is a power law. This curve is precisely 
critical dynamical behavior, similar to self organized criticality, (15). 
 
Further, using surrogate data on firm death avalanches, on observes in real 
economies just the same power law distribution of avalanches. Therefore, while 
the data are sparse, even this simple Formal Cause model, that totally ignores 
any specific efficient causes, seems to be telling us about the real economy and 
its evolution, (15). 
 
Collectively Autocatalytic Sets and the Evolution of the Real Economy 
 
I end this section discussing an early application of the theory of collectively 
autocatalytic sets to the real economy. In its general form, the theory of the 
emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets concerns, as noted, objects, 
transformation among objects and mediation of those transformations by the 
objects themselves. The general theory is independent of both what the objects 
are, the transformations among them, how those transformations may occur, and 
how the objects may mediate the transformations. Thus it is independent of any 
specific efficient causes. 
 
Consider the real economy. It consists in input goods that enter production 
processes and are transformed to output goods, and typically goods themselves 
carry out or mediate the production processes. For example, two boards and a 
nail are input goods to a production process consisting of a hand and a hammer, 
leading to the output good of two boards nailed together. But the hammer itself is 
a good produced by the economy. Hence the real economy is a ʻgeneralizedʼ 
collectively autocatalytic set, “fed” by renewable resources and human labor. 
 
Does our real economy contain collectively autocatalytic sets, with the caveat 
that “catalysis” is a loose name for production functions or markets? Yes. 
Consider the invention of the gasoline automobile. It unleashed a Schumpeterian 
gale of creative destruction, wiping out the horse, buggy, saddle, corral, and so 
on as ways to make substantial livings except at the margins of a new economy. 
With the invention and spread of the gasoline automobile, its complements 
emerged: an oil and gas industry, gasoline stations, paved roads, lines on paved 
roads, traffic signals, traffic courts, motels, fast food restaurants, suburbia and 
people living in suburbia who needed cars. This is a collectively autocatalytic set 
at the heart of our modern economy. 
 
The improved theory of CAS, called RAFs, by Steel and Hordijk (10,11) and all 
three of us (12), finds very important new features of RAFs, and thus their 
potential application to the economy. First, given a maximum length binary string, 
say length N, there is a maximum diversity of “goods” in the economy hence a 
maximum RAF. But within this maximum RAF are irreducible RAFs, having the 
property that removal of any member of the irreducible set would lead to the 
collapse of the irreducible set. Within an irreducible RAF there can be 
“dependent” chains of other reaction pathways that “hang off” the irreducible 
RAF, but do not sustain it. These can be economic activities such as the 
Japanese entrepreur above. Next, intermediate sized RAFs can be formed by the 
union of two or more irreducible RAFs, or the union of an irreducible RAF with a 
mid-sized RAF, or the union of two mid-sized RAFs. This process leading 
ultimately to the maximal RAF is a partially ordered set, hence there are many 
pathways of assembly of ever more complex RAFs from the irreducible ones. 
Further, if some RAF exists already, transient presence of some new “molecular 
species” can trigger the formation of a new enlarged RAF involving the initial RAF 
as a part of a growing “ecosystem” that provides a niche for the emergence of the 
enlarged RAF. Thus we have the beginnings of a theory of the evolution of either 
an ecosystem or an economy growing new adjacent sectors. 
 
These models are NOT efficient cause entailing laws as in the Newtonian 
Paradigm. Allowing ourselves to call these modelsʼ results a Formal Cause Law, 
these laws are not reducible to any efficient cause or similar Newtonian Paradigm 
entailing law. Thus again, as in the case of CAS theory applied to the origin of life 
and here to the evolution of the economy, we have a new kind of Law, Formal 
Cause Law, that tells us about the real world. Indeed, just what kind of law is the 
CAS or RAF theory can apply to molecular reaction systems and the economy? 
The theory is about objects, transformations among objects, and objects abetting 
or inhibiting those transformations, independent of the specific objects, 
transformations, or how transformations are abetted. It is a theory about the 
organization of processes, independent of efficient causes. These are, thus, 
Formal Cause laws, not efficient cause laws. 
 
If the claim just made is true, that the CAS theory above is about objects, 
transformations among objects, and objects abetting those transformations, 
regardless of the material nature of those objects and transformations and how 
the transformations are “abetted”, we seem, strikingly, to be finding laws, that our 
Formal Cause Laws are beyond materialism itself! The “answer” is not to be 
found in the “stuffs” and efficient causes among the stuffs, but in laws about the 
organization of processes whatever the stuffs and efficient causes among the 
stuffs. If so, then centuries of belief in materialism as the only basis of science 
seems wrong. This is a very large claim we shall have to examine carefully. It 
promises a new way of doing science and learning about the real world. 
 
Second, as noted earlier in Part 1 about the economy, the examples of the 
invention of the tractor and the new Japanese book selling business show, the 
that new ways of making products and businesses are often not prestatable at 
all. So we can have no laws of motion, initial and boundary conditions and 
entailing Newton Paradigm laws, yet, using Formal Cause laws, we can find out 
about the real world evolving economy even though its detailed becoming is not 
even prestatable. Thus Formal Cause Laws, while presently remaining 
algorithmic, can both hope to tell us about the non-algorithmic becoming of the 
real world and also surpass the requirements that the relevant variables in the 
ever changing phase space of the evolving system even be prestatable. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article argues that we are beyond the Reductionism of the Newtonian 
Paradigm that has dominated our thinking about how science should be done, in 
two ways. First, no efficient cause entailing laws for the evolution of the 
biosphere can be found. Thus, that evolution is beyond Reductionism. A fortiori, 
so too are economic, legal, social, cultural and historical evolution, with the 
caveat that we need not consider mind and responsible free will for the evolution 
of the biosphere but these thorny issues may and probably do bear on the 
evolution of the economy, legal systems, social systems, culture and history. 
But second, we are no longer constrained to the Newtonian Paradigm to learn 
about the real world and its evolution even where that evolution is not prestatable 
and hence not open to efficient cause entaiing laws. A barely understood new 
class of laws, Formal Cause Laws, typically built upon the generic behaviors of 
large ensembles of systems, appear able to tell us about the origin of molecular 
reproduction and what the emergence of molecular reproduction is expected and 
about aspects of the evolution of the economy even though that evolution is not 
prestatable. It also begins to tell us about sub and supracritical economic growth 
independently of the unstated efficient causes of that growth, and the potential 
roles of generalized collectively autocatalytic sets in growing new sectors of the 
economy, again without attention to any specific efficient causes. Beyond 
Materialism, we may be finding a new way to do science. 
 
It is unclear how the ideas presented in this article will develop. It is all too new. 
But I hope a beginning has been made. 
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